ABSTRACT:
Introduction
The Netherlands, like most OECD-countries, is facing an ageing population. Especially, this is a complication for the state pension called AOW (Algemene Ouderdoms Wet) which is financed through a pay-as-you-go system. The state pension is the first pillar in the Dutch pension scheme, which is based on three pillars. The second pillar consists out of supplementary company or sector pension facilities. Employees are obliged to take part in those second pillar pension programmes. The third pillar contains individual pension saving programmes which are voluntarily to participate in. Both second and third pillar pensions are fully funded.
The dynamic micro simulation model SADNAP (Social Affairs Department of the Netherlands Ageing and Pensions model) is being developed for calculating the financial and economic implications of the ageing problem and of the policy measures considered. A micro simulation model, as compared to macro-oriented models, can give more detailed information on the ageing problem and on the redistributive effects of policy options, which can be used in the evaluation of those options. The model uses administrative datasets of all Dutch public pensions and entitlements for all public pensions and a large share of private pensions.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 briefly overviews the Dutch pension system, the forecasting models currently in use at the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment and gives a short general introduction to micro simulation models and the SADNAP model. Sections 3 and 4 present in more detail two recent extensions of the SADNAP model. Section 3 focuses on the modelling of incomes and redistribution within the state pension system and in section 4 the modelling of the retirement decision using the option value approach is described.
In section 5 the main results of the model are presented. These results are limited to the baseline scenario of unchanged policies. A separate paper is dedicated to an evaluation of different policy options with the model. Section 6, finally, contains conclusions and some topics for future research.
Background

The Dutch pension system
The Dutch government supplies a state pension called AOW to all persons aged 65 or over when The state pension scheme provides a basic minimum income guarantee in case of a full entitlement. Therefore the system makes a distinction between partners of a couple and singles.
A single gets a benefit of 70 percent of the net minimum wage 3 and a person out of a couple gets 50 percent of the net minimum wage. Until 2015, persons with a (non-working) partner younger than 65 can supplement their state pension of 50 percent with an allowance of another 50 percent to a combined maximum of 100 percent of the minimum wage. Partly entitled persons can lay a claim on social assistance. Social assistance, however, is income and means tested.
The AOW is a pay-as-you-go arrangement, the current population of workers pay for the current population of pensioners. The AOW is financed through a premium paid by these workers. The premium is fixed at a rate of 17.9 percent of the first two tax brackets (the limiting income is approximately € 32,000 in 2009). This premium revenue is not sufficient to cover all AOW costs. The government contributes the part of the AOW costs (currently about one third) that are not covered by the premiums. The government contribution is financed by taxes, which are paid by pensioners as well.
The importance of 2 nd and 3 rd pillar pensions for the income position of the elderly is growing as more people are saving for such pensions and their average savings are increasing. Per person average 2 nd pillar pension savings are almost equal now to the average 1 st pillar state pension savings. In the future, it is to be expected that 2 nd and 3 rd pillar pensions together will provide more than half of the average pension income. Although there are many 2 nd pillar pension funds in the Netherlands, each with its own rules on contributions and pensions, broadly speaking one can say that pension funds try to supplement the state pension to a total gross income level of 70% of the final wage. Most pension funds recently switched from a final wage system to a career average system, but on average they still aim for a gross pension level of 70% of the final wage. Because pensioners do not have to pay state pension contributions anymore, the net height of their 1 st and 2 nd pillar pensions together usually, in case of a full pension, comes Draft close to 90% of the final wage. Other income sources, like 3 rd pillar pensions can add to this income level.
Models currently in use
The Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment is responsible for preparing state pension forecasts for the yearly budget. The budget horizon is 6 years (the current budget for 2010 contains forecasts from 2009 until 2014). Although beyond the budget horizon, the long-term forecast of pension expenses is of great importance as well because government budgets are also affected by the long-term sustainability of public finance. Besides the financial effects for the government budget, the Minister of Social Affairs and Employment is also responsible for income policies and labour participation policies. When new policy options are discussed, a broad analysis of both short-term and long-term financial effects, income effects and labour participation effects will be required. Moreover, in the case of ageing-related policy measures, income effects will not be limited to direct effects on purchasing power but will include intra-generational and intergenerational redistribution issues as well. In order to assess all these effects, a number of different models are used.
For state pension expenses, a simple macro model is used, using forecasts of the number of pensioners for the most relevant subgroups of the state pension population (men and women, singles and couples with and without a partner allowance, complete and reduced pensions).
These volume forecasts are supplied by the state pension administration office (SVB). The macro model calculates the costs by multiplying the expected group sizes with the average pensions for each group. As the SVB forecasts last until 2024 and rely heavily on extrapolating existing trends, for the long-term development of the state pension expenses, the Ministry relies on a macro AGE model of CPB. This model, called GAMMA (see Van Ewijk et al., 2006) , is used once every four years (in the run-up to the general elections) for a long-term forecast of the whole Dutch economy. For income effects, the long running static micro simulation model Micros (Hendrix, 1993 ) is in use since the early 1990's. This model focuses on short-term income effects of complex sets of policy measures. Labour participation effects are quantified on an ad-hoc basis using recent research papers by CPB and others. Redistribution effects are mostly abstracted from or quantified on an ad-hoc basis as well.
This approach has several shortcomings. Because different models from different internal and external sources are used, it is very difficult to obtain a consistent picture of the effects of
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In the first place, information does get lost because the macro model uses only a small number of groups sharing the same basic characteristics. Age groups are not included, for example, although among the population of 65 and over, different ages may have very different characteristics. Second, there are certain features of the AOW that cannot simply be taken into account with macro models, such as changes in migration patterns and changes in household situation. Migration affects the entitlements to the AOW because the AOW-entitlement depends on citizenship. Changes in number and age of immigrants and emigrants will affect the pension expenses later on. The AOW-entitlement also depends on household situation. Two singles get a higher pension than two persons in a couple, so when the number of singles among the population of pensioners rises, the cost of the AOW will rise as well. Third, the macro models are limited to the state pensions, that provide the basic income level, whereas the main differences in income position of pensioners are caused by private pensions. The Micros model, which is used for the income effects, is a static model that is not capable of adequate long-term forecasts.
Fourth, the effects on labour participation and income redistribution are not captured at all by the current models in use at the Ministry.
Therefore the Ministry has been developing the dynamic micro simulation model SADNAP to handle the problems appointed before. SADNAP is an integral ageing and pensions model, including the income and redistributive effects of different policy measures. The purpose of SADNAP is to provide consistent and integral forecasts of both short-term and long-term effects of the baseline scenario of unchanged policies and various policy measures on the cost of state pensions for government budget, the income position of the elderly, redistribution and labour participation. SADNAP has already been used since 2007 for budgetary forecasts.
Micro simulation models
Micro simulation basically is a modelling technique that uses large datasets containing data on the individual level. Records on individual persons contain characteristics like birth year, gender, ethnicity, income level, household status etc. Transition probabilities and institutional rules are applied to simulate whether events will happen in the future to a specific record, e.g. whether
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Micro simulation models can be subdivided in many different ways (O'Donoghue, 2001 ).
The most important one is between dynamic and static models. With dynamic micro simulation the characteristics of a record can change over time. Static micro simulation does not allow characteristics to change. Although in static simulations reweighing techniques can be used to allow for changes in population composition, static micro simulation is usually seen as more suited for short-term forecasts, like the short-term impact of fiscal measures, whereas dynamic micro simulation is seen as more suited for long-term forecasts like the impact of ageing.
Micro simulation is subject to Monte-Carlo variability, resulting in different outcomes for each individual simulation experiment. Of course, a larger sample can reduce the fluctuations between different runs with the model, but not eliminate them. Moreover, in large dynamic micro simulations sample size can still be limited due to disk capacity or computer speed. One can deal with the Monte-Carlo variability in several ways. First, several simulations can be done and an average outcome can be calculated. The difference in average outcome between the base situation and the policy alternative can then be accounted to the policy change. A second approach is proposed by Klevmarken (2007) , who describes a calibration technique in which the simulation results are aligned to an a priori defined target, such as a macro forecast, eliminating the variability. Third, Monte Carlo variance can be avoided at all by using a fixed set of random numbers used to generate the events. This last method is useful to allow for replication of model results and to compare policy alternatives to the base situation, because when the random numbers are fixed, differences between two simulations can only be caused by the policy change.
For every individual a simulation of a policy alternative can then be performed under exactly the same conditions as the simulation of the baseline scenario. In SADNAP, both calibration and fixing of random numbers are used.
Micro simulation is very useful when information for specific individuals or groups of individuals is needed. Information on specific groups can also be obtained by creating more groups within cell-based macro-forecasts. But in practice, because of the large number of subgroups that arise when taking into account all the relevant characteristics, these cell-based replacing the starting population with new cohorts over time. Cassels, Harding and Kelly (2006) identify some success and failure factors and recommend models to have clear objectives, a modular design, be user friendly, produce timely output and be transparent. With SADNAP these recommendations have been followed by initially limiting the model to the budgetary impact of the state pensions only.
The SADNAP model
The Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment has been developing the SADNAP model since
2006. As the model is modularly designed, attention was first focused on the demographic model and the state pension forecast. Therefore, since 2007 the SADNAP output can already be used in preparing the state pension budget forecasts of the Ministry. An early project description is documented in Van der Werf, Van Sonsbeek and Gradus (2007) . In later years, the original demographic modules have been extended. The immigration and emigration code has been improved in order to allow for the interdependency between the two (immigrants having a higher emigration rate). Also, the take-up of state pensions by former emigrants has been incorporated in the model. The household formation code has been improved in order to provide reliable relationship patterns at the micro level. In a new module, non-budgetary aspects (like income distribution and labour participation / retirement decision) have been introduced in order to get a more complete picture of the pros and cons of different ageing-related policy measures.
In the early versions, the income was limited to the state pension (building up of entitlements for the population aged 64 and below and pension payments for the population aged 65 and over). The income position has now been supplemented with private pension data.
First with rough estimates based on aggregate data and meanwhile with a full micro data set on private pension entitlements which has been supplied by Statistics Netherlands. A detailed description of the demographic and income modules of SADNAP is given in appendix A and a detailed description of the micro and macro data sources used in SADNAP is supplied in appendix recently. The first is the differentiation of mortality rates which is used to investigate the redistribution within the state pension scheme, and which is described in section 3. The second is the modelling of labour participation and the retirement decision, which is described in section 4.
Both extensions fill the gaps that were left in the assessment of policy alternatives as described in section 2.2.
Comparison with other dynamic population micro simulation models
Within the Netherlands, SADNAP is the second attempt to develop a dynamic population micro simulation model capturing ageing issues. The only comparable model in the Netherlands is the NEDYMAS model (Nelissen, 1993) , which was prominent during the 1990's. Although SADNAP, as compared to some well-known international simulation models, is a comparatively simple and small scale project, it shares some key characteristics with these larger models. Cassels, Harding Education and health are abstracted from in SADNAP. Financial wealth and savings are also abstracted from, but are planned for extension in the future. SADNAP is comparatively narrowscoped, like for example Dynacan, so most effort is put in subjects directly related to pensions and ageing. In the current SADNAP version, most effort has been put in the retirement decision model, which consequently is comparatively elaborate.
Modelling redistribution within the state pension system
The Dutch state pension scheme can be classified as a 'Beveridge'-style public pension programme (Disney, 2004) , characterized by significant departures from actuarial fairness and significant provision of private retirement benefits, as opposed to 'Bismarck'-style public pension programmes, characterized by high 'actuarial fairness' and limited private provision of private retirement benefits. The Dutch scheme, with its flat rate pensions for singles and cohabitants, therefore has a highly intra-generational redistributive character.
There is also redistribution from higher to lower incomes because higher incomes contribute more to the scheme during their lifetime. However, this holds only true for income differences up till the limiting income of approximately € 32,000 (in 2009 In SADNAP, the differences in mortality rates by income are derived from the study of Martikainen et al. (2001) . The expected total private pension is used as a proxy for income. This means that people do not move between income deciles, only one "lifetime" decile is assigned per person. The estimation of the pension entitlements has been improved recently because a detailed micro dataset of company pensions has become available. This dataset is described in appendix B. The wage level of the participants is known for the base year. Their pension entitlements are based on continuation of their current wage level throughout their working life.
That means, the younger one is in the base year, the less accurate the pension entitlement forecast is as wages are expected to rise during the working life. Wages in the Netherlands are strongly correlated with age. Figure Currently SADNAP lacks a more elaborate modelling of wages over the life cycle like in for example Borella and Coda Moscarola (2005) . However, when wages and pension savings are assumed to follow each other's development over the life cycle, the replacement rates will The population decomposition used allows for an analysis of redistribution within the state pension scheme by aggregating pension payments for each subgroup. Such an analysis is presented in section 5.2.
Modelling the retirement decision of employees
In most current literature the retirement decision is modelled by using the option value model by Stock and Wise (1990) . More and more often, this approach is implemented in micro simulation models (e.g. Dekkers, 2007) . In the option value model, the individual chooses the optimal retirement age R* by maximizing the expected lifetime utility from both consumption (labour income) and leisure (retirement income). In this decision the expected value of all current and future incomes V t (R) at all possible retirement ages t is considered. Draft
(1) R* = R that maximizes
Here β (=1/1+ρ) represents the discount factor (with ρ the time preference parameter), p(s|t) the survival probability, U y the utility of consumption, Y s the labour income, γ the risk-aversion parameter, U b the utility of leisure, k the leisure preference parameter and B s (R) the income after retirement. Often, the option value model is simplified (Euwals, Van Vuuren and Wolthoff, 2006) by fixing the parameters γ, k and ρ at some given values, but in a micro simulation model, heterogeneity in the parameters can be implemented straightforwardly. Also the peak value model as proposed by Coile and Gruber (1998) and discussed by Samwick (2001) can be considered a simplification of the option value model. In the peak value model future earnings play no role in the retirement decision anymore. This approach chooses the retirement age that maximizes the expected lifetime retire income. Abstracting from future earnings allows setting the leisure preference parameter k to 1, which as Samwick (2001) In SADNAP, assuming 60 to be the first and 70 to be the last possible retirement age, for each individual the option value is computed for retirement ages 60 to 69. The utility functions U y and U b equal labour and retirement income respectively. The model then depends on generic gender-specific survival rates and the discount rate, leisure preference value, risk-aversion value, labour income and retirement income that are all specific to the individual. The expected retirement age is set to the year (t) that maximizes the option value. In this retirement decision the expected value of all current and future incomes V t (R) is taken into account.
In the option value model, the role of the discount rate is important. In the original estimates of Stock and Wise, based on utility rather than income, a very high discount rate of 0.28 (corresponding to a discount factor of 0.78) was estimated. In most later research (e.g. -Supan, 2000 and Berkel and Börsch-Supan, 2003 ) much lower discount rates of 0.03 to 0.05 were used. In general, in the literature the estimates of the time preference parameter vary within a wide range, as is shown in an overview by Frederick, Loewenstein and O'Donoghue Draft (2002) . This suggests heterogeneity. Samwick (1998) notes that a distribution of preference parameters like the discount rate should be assumed instead of a fixed value. Samwick finds a median value of the discount rate of 0.08 for all ages (slightly lower for the 60-65 years age group). He finds a distribution with 50% of discount rates between 0.03 and 0.15 but also a large number of outliers with about 5% having negative discount rates of -0.15 and below and 20%
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having discount rates of 0.2 and above. Also Gustman and Steinmeier (2005) and for women at 1.64. In the simulation model, the average is assumed to be 2.0 and a uniform distribution of leisure valuation rates between 1.0 and 3.0 is applied for both men and women.
Correlation between time preference and leisure preference was hypothesized and rejected by Gustman and Steinmeier (2005) .
The estimates of the risk-aversion parameter vary less. In general, people are risk-averse in pension and retirement decisions. In the option value model, the lower the risk-aversion parameter γ is, the earlier the retirement age will be. Stock and Wise estimate the parameter γ at The future retirement incomes (both state pension and 2 nd pillar pension) are easy to predict at age 60, as most entitlements have been built up and mainly depend on institutional Draft parameters. However, the future labour income is more difficult to predict. A simple approach would be to set the labour income for ages 61 to 70 equal to the labour income at age 60. For the higher ages this may not be a good approach because of the decrease in productivity that can be expected in combination with rising probabilities of getting disabled or unemployed, which the individual will take into account in his decision. Therefore we specify the formula for labour income in year (t+1) as a function of labour income in year (t), the expected yearly wage decrease τ due to productivity loss and the probability of getting disabled p(d|t) or unemployed p(u|t) during year t. We assume that both unemployment and disability lead to an income loss of 30%
as both disability and unemployment benefits roughly equal 70% of the former wage 4 .
(2)
For an indication of a plausible value for τ we can have a closer look at the age-earnings profile of elderly workers. Figure 2 represents all wages including those of the self-employed and of retirees working part-time and table 8 represents the wages of the employees only. From figure 2, it appears that the average wage at age 64 is 38% lower than at age 59, which corresponds to a value of τ of 0.09. From table 8, it appears that the 60-64 years old earn almost the same as the 55-59 years old, which corresponds to a value of τ of zero. The latter intuitively corresponds to a society in which demotion is almost non-existent. The wage decrease from figure 8 reflects both overrepresentation of self-employed, who work longer but earn less, and employees working less hours, due to either their preferences or their health. We can conclude that people that work on until 65 will have no loss of income, but that when also the employees that due to preferences or health work less than 20 hours a week (who are considered retired) are taken into account, an income loss exists. We tested average values of τ of 0 and 0.045 and wages and pensions were known with enough accuracy from about age 35 onwards. The option value approach computes an expected retirement age based on a forward-looking calculation. In reality, events like unemployment and disability will influence the retirement decision. Therefore, after determining the optimal retirement age at age 60, all individuals work through until the optimal retirement age unless they become unemployed or disabled. As both unemployment and disability can be considered absorbing states from age 60 onwards 5 , in that case the year that one becomes unemployed or disabled is considered to be the year of retirement. Unemployment and disability probabilities are observed in 2008 for the ages 60 through 64. Unemployment and disability probabilities for age 65 onwards are considered to be equal to those observed at 64.
Whereas disability probabilities, even at higher ages, are currently quite low because of the 2006 disability reform (see Van Sonsbeek and Gradus, 2006) , unemployment probabilities rise up to 5%
per year for 64 years old in 2008, which was still a year that was barely affected by the economic crisis. Table 2 summarizes the option value parameters used in SADNAP Furthermore, we consider mortality before age 70 as related to ill health at age 65, so individuals who die before age 70 will not retire past age 65. This assumption was also made in the 2008 government proposal to introduce a retirement window between age 65 and 70, which still has Draft to be discussed in parliament. This proposal, that is designed in an actuarially neutral way, will still cause costs because of adverse selection. People with a higher life expectancy are more likely to opt for delaying the state pension. By excluding the people who died before age 70 from delaying their pension, average life expectancy of the ones that did opt for delaying is about one year above the average, which is in line with findings on adverse selection in the German retirement system by Kühntopf and Tivig (2008) .
Model results
This section gives the results of the baseline scenario of unchanged pension policies. Section 5.1 focuses on the demographic and budgetary results. These results are up-to-date projections, using the demographic and budgetary modules of SADNAP that were already in use. The sections 5.2 and 5.3 focus on the redistribution within the state pension system and the retirement decision of older workers. These results come from the new SADNAP modules described in this paper. Section 5.4 compares the SADNAP results to other comparable model results.
Budgetary results
The population of the Netherlands does not grow much anymore in the future, but its In reality, pensions of course will increase in real terms, as GDP does. Van Ewijk et al. (2006) assume for the oncoming decades state pensions to increase by 1.7% a year in real terms and GDP to grow by 1.4% a year in real terms. If that assumption holds true, in terms of % of GDP, the state pension costs will rise from 4.8% in 2009 to 9.6% in 2040 as GDP grows slower than the state pensions in real terms.
There are several reasons for the lower than expected rise of the state pension costs.
From the simulation results, it appears that not only the size of the population of pensioners changes but that its composition changes as well. In particular, three trends are important. A third important trend is the rising labour participation over time, especially among women. This influences the number of people qualifying for the partner allowance. These allowances currently account for € 1.4 billion. A person qualifies for the partner allowance when he or she turns 65 and has a partner that is younger than 65 and earns not enough income of his own 6 . Mostly, people qualifying for the partner allowance are men. Men tend to have a wife that is on average 3 years younger, and labour participation among older women is still particularly low. In fact, the majority of men turning 65 currently qualifies for the partner allowance.
However, as the labour participation among women is rising, this number will be decreasing in the future. Therefore, the costs of the partner allowances will grow only slowly until 2013, then stabilize more or less on the same level and decrease slowly after 2035. In the meantime the share of women in the age category 60-64 that participate on the labour market will have doubled. In 2040 the costs of the partner allowance will be almost equal to 2009. 6 When the partner earns an income below 15% of the minimum wage, a full partner allowance of up to 50% of the minimum wage is given. When the partner earns an income between 15% and 97.5% of the minimum wage (SVB, 2008) , a reduced partner allowance is given. When the partner earns more than 97.5% of the minimum wage, no allowance is granted anymore. Draft The higher income quintiles receive an above average share of total state pension because of differences in life expectancy. This redistribution through life expectancy is substantial. The 1 st income quintile receives more than a third less than the 5 th income quintile (a ratio of 0.79 vs. a ratio of 1.21). This is mainly due to the difference in life expectancy, but also to the larger share of incomplete state pensions in the lower income quintiles. Women receive 6% more state pension from the scheme than their share in the cohort would justify. Singles receive 11% more state pension from the scheme than their share in the cohort would justify. This is because the lower life expectancy of singles is overcompensated by their higher state pension. Immigrants receive 34% less state pension from the scheme than their share in the cohort would justify.
However, this large difference is in the first place due to immigrants building up less entitlement during their life and only for a smaller part to differences in life expectancy.
Retirement decision
The participation transitions after age 60 in SADNAP are modelled through the behavioural option value model described in section 4. The participation rates at age 60 are given by the participation status model from appendix A.3 and are similar to the participation rates for people
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February 18, 2010 24 Draft aged 60 as projected by CPB. Only for the ones that are still working at age 60, the retirement decision is determined by the option value model. This excludes about 40% of the cohorts as even in the long run some 30% of the 60 years old men and 50% of the 60 years old women will be on benefit or not participating at the labour market at all.
When the distribution of individual retirement ages is studied, we find spikes at certain pivot ages. This is a well known phenomenon (e.g. Lumsdaine, Stock and Wise, 1995 and Gustman and Steinmeier, 2005) , that can be partly explained by retirement taking place according to social-cultural norms, but also partly by economic reasons. As the models, like the option value approach we use, only take the latter into account, they usually underestimate the spikes. For the Netherlands, Nelissen (2002) finds a strong preference for individuals to retire either at the first or the last possible retirement age. In the Netherlands, the first possible retirement age used to be 60 years in many sectors. Since the late 1980's for most employees a generous early retirement scheme existed that guaranteed an income level of 70-80% of the final wage without loss of pension accruals from 60 years of age onwards. As a result, most people did indeed retire at age 60 (Euwals, de Mooij and van Vuuren, 2009 ). Gradually, the generous early retirement schemes are being replaced by actuarially neutral schemes until, from 2015 onwards all schemes are fully actuarially neutral (Bovenberg and Gradus, 2008) . The last possible retirement age in the Netherlands for most employees is still 65. At that age, the state pension starts being paid and most employees automatically get fired. However, meanwhile Dutch government has sent a proposal to parliament to abolish the automatism of employees getting fired at 65 and to allow delaying the state pension to 70 years of age instead of the current 65.
When the retirement decisions in SADNAP are evaluated, indeed, when the generous early retirement scheme is in place, the majority of retirement decisions takes place at 60, the earliest possible age. In a fully actuarially neutral scheme (assuming a last possible retirement age The average retirement age increases with 2.5 years for the population still participating at age 60. Results in the same order of magnitude were found by Kapteyn and de Vos (2004) , who simulated the effect of a change from the generous ERS that existed in the Netherlands at the time to a more or less actuarially neutral scheme. They forecasted an increase in average retirement age by 4 years for males and insignificant changes for women with the option value model, which in the same study they found to perform better than the peak value model in the baseline estimation. In 2007, retirement age had indeed increased by 2 years to 61.7 years from below 60 during the 1990's when the generous early retirement schemes were common (Advies Commissie Arbeidsparticipatie, 2008). However, even when the generous early retirement schemes were common, a fair share of the workers continued working until 65 or later. This concerns mainly the self-employed and also employees that were not covered by collective agreements on early retirement. On the other hand, 40% of the population is not participating in the workforce anymore at age 60, which still leaves important participation gains to be made. The model predicts 26% of the people working at 60 to retire before 65, 38% to retire at 65 and the other 36% to retire past 65. The ones retiring early are the ones with either high time preference, high leisure preference, high expected wage decrease or the risk-averse ones or a combination of the above. The influence of time preference and leisure preference seems to be dominant. Also, disability is an important factor causing early retirement for about 1 in 6 retirees that retire early. As the disability scheme in the Netherlands currently is so strict that abuse of the scheme as an early retirement way is virtually impossible, the unemployment scheme is nowadays often used as an early retirement pathway at all ages. Table 4 gives a characterization of the retirees per retirement age: The SADNAP model rightly predicts a strong preference for retiring at 65, the year the state pension (and partner allowance) start being paid. However, the number of people working on past 65 is slightly higher than the levels currently seen, especially for women. Probably, the automatism of employees getting fired at 65, which will be abolished soon, may influence current retirement patterns. Moreover, it is known from Coile (2004) that husbands' and wives' retirement behaviour is influenced not only by their own financial incentives but also by spill over effects from their spouses' incentives, which may explain why women's retirement age is overestimated by the option value algorithm. The SADNAP estimates may give a good estimate of
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Validation and comparison to other models
The demographic model results are benchmarked with the official population forecast of the CBS.
The SADNAP estimates stay in all years within a margin of 1% of the comparable CBS estimates for main age groups. There is no exact match with macro population numbers as only the yearly number of births and immigrants and mortality and emigration rates are aligned to CBS forecasts.
The grey pressure, a key indicator, equals both in SADNAP and in the CBS-projection 49% in 2040. Table 5 gives an overview of some key SADNAP results as compared to comparable estimates. 
Conclusions and topics for future research
Like most other OECD countries, the Netherlands is facing an ageing population, causing a burden on public finance. A significant part of the rise in public expenses will be caused by the rise in costs for the state pensions. The old-age dependency ratio almost doubles from now until 2040
(the peak of the ageing process in the Netherlands).
The It is shown that in the baseline scenario the state pension costs rise less sharply then the number of pensioners. The composition of the pensioners population is changing. The number of immigrants with reduced state pensions is rising. During the oncoming decades, the share of singles among the pensioners population is decreasing. However, this trend will be reversed in the future. Also the rising labour participation of women decreases the cost of partner allowances. The downward influences together amount to 0.3% of GDP in 2040. This partly compensates for the increasing longevity from the latest population forecast.
The intra-generational redistribution within the Dutch pension scheme is shown to be substantial. The bottom income quintile gets more than a third less out of the system than the top income quintile, mainly because of lower life expectancy. Singles, however, get more out of the system than partners of a couple. Their higher pension compensates for their shorter life expectancy.
The modelling of the retirement decision through the option value model confirms the retirement patterns known in the Netherlands when a very generous early retirement scheme was still in place. Average retirement age for the ones that are still working at 60 can rise by 2.5 years when the early retirement schemes have become fully actuarially neutral. In the actuarially
February 18, 2010 30 Draft neutral scheme, a strong preference for either retiring at 65 or at the last retirement age is suggested. The time preference and leisure preference parameters appear to be the most important drivers for the retirement decision. An assumption of wage decrease is added to the model in order to get more plausible results and less people working on until the last possible retirement age. Another important factor is the role of disability and unemployment. Especially the unemployment scheme is still used as an early retirement pathway.
Future research will focus on evaluating policy options with the model. New datasets on state pensions and private pensions will become available for more recent years and more information on 3 rd pillar pensions and financial wealth will become available on the micro level.
Also, the availability of linkable datasets of different years will allow for an estimation of the option value parameters and their distribution. Draft 
A.1 The demographic model
Before the simulation starts, a base data file is created out of the source files described in section 3. Three different data sources are combined into a single file containing a representative sample of the Dutch population in the base year (2006) . Aggregate CBS data on the population aged 0-15 years are used in the base year. For the population aged 15-64 years, the micro datasets from CBS on state pension entitlements and private pension entitlements as described in section 3.2 are used. Finally the micro dataset from SVB on state pension payments as described in section 3.1 is used for the population aged 65 and over. These three datasets complete the population for the base year. The records for people aged younger than 15 are constructed by using general demographic CBS statistic on the age, gender and ethnicity composition of the Dutch population.
As state pension entitlements are zero until persons turn 15 and children do not have wages or private pension entitlements, no additional information on this group is needed.
The CBS file with entitlement data for people aged 15-64 has another year of origin Although we now have an accurate population forecast, there is still a problem left relating to the complexity of the modelling of immigration and emigration. We need to model 'remigration'. This is important because on average during the last couple of years about 50% of the emigrants are former immigrants and about 20% of the immigrants are former emigrants. By not allowing for remigration, the share of immigrants in the population will clearly be overestimated. The former (immigrants having a greater emigration rate) can easily be implemented by using different sets of emigration rates depending on whether someone was born in the Netherlands or not. The latter is more difficult. Only few of the larger simulation models, notably Lifepaths and Sesim (Pennec and Keegan, 2007) allow for emigrants re-entering the population. SADNAP abstracts from remigration of emigrants, resulting at the micro level in a slight overrepresentation of small entitlements as returning emigrants continue building up their already existing rights, whereas SADNAP assumes these rights to consist of separate parts belonging to two separate persons.
Moreover, we still miss a part of the population that will be entitled to a state pension in the future, but is not living in the Netherlands anymore. As can be seen from table 1, 9% of the current population of pensioners is living abroad. Since emigration is modelled, the model captures all future pensioners who live in the Netherlands in the base year, but will emigrate in the future. However, we still miss the people aged between 15 and 64 in the base year who built up state pension entitlements in the Netherlands in the past but emigrated before the base year.
To correct for this, records are added for former emigrants. As a starting point, the youngest cohort of pensioners in the base year is used. Of this cohort, also 9% of the pensioners is living abroad. From the state pension entitlement, their year of emigration can be estimated.
Everybody missing 1 year of entitlement is assumed to have emigrated at age 64, everybody missing 2 years at age 63 and so on. As in the simulation, people aged 64 in the base year can emigrate in the first year of the simulation, after that first year of the simulation only the claimants living abroad that emigrated at age 63 or younger have to be added. As is known from SVB (2008) that non-take-up among people living abroad is common, a correction is made, based on the assumption that the younger one emigrated, the less likely one is to claim a Dutch state pension.
The whole process described above is represented in figure 6 . The filled boxes represent the micro databases from the base years that are used in the simulation and the blank boxes
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A.2 The household formation model
In the next steps variables are added to the demographic model, such as household type. From the databases of pension entitlements and pension payments, the household status of all individuals aged 15 and over is known. SADNAP distinguishes between singles and cohabitants only 7 . The aggregated state pension for two singles is higher than the aggregated state pension of two partners of a couple.
Age and gender dependent transition probabilities are used to determine whether singles remain single or start cohabitating and whether cohabitants become single or stay together. The transition probabilities can be derived from the age-and gender specific household forecast from CBS as described in section 3.3.
When PS denotes the probability of being single and PC the probability of cohabiting, the transition probabilities PSC (probability of a single cohabiting the next year) and PCS (probability of a cohabitant being single again the next year) can be defined as follows: If the correction terms (age, gender) are set to zero, most individuals will have only one lasting relationship during their lifetime. The higher the correction terms are set, the more relationships will be started and finished each year. The correction terms can be used to align the simulation to the information on household formation and dissolution from the CBS household forecast. In the baseline scenario, the terms are set to zero.
However, by introducing differences in mortality rates (see section 3), a deviation is introduced from the original population projection in the numbers of singles and cohabitants by age. As the household formation model from appendix A.2 is based on the original population projection, the numbers need to be realigned in order to match the original population projection again. Concretely, the equations (3) and (5) In some larger micro simulation models, the cohabiting process is very elaborate. Those models contain a formalized mate matching module in which partners are found within the model based on certain matching criteria (for an overview of methods see Perese, 2002 and for an overview of models see Bacon and Pennec, 2007) . SADNAP follows a simple approach, in which the important characteristics of the partner are determined as soon as those characteristics become relevant for the model calculations. In the ageing calculations the gender, age and participation status of the partner are the most important characteristics. The gender of the partner is assumed always to be the opposite of the gender of the other partner. From the dataset of state pension Draft payments, detailed information on the age difference between partners of a couple is available.
The age differences from the youngest cohort of this dataset (the 1941 birth cohort) are used, assuming that the distribution of age differences in relationships will remain the same in the future. Given the gender and age of a partner, the corresponding participation rate can be derived from the age and gender specific participation estimates as described in section 3.3.
At this point enough information is available to calculate the costs of the state pension.
Information is available on the future population size and its division over ages. Starting with current state pension entitlements, the building up of entitlements in the future can be simulated. As information on the household type is also available, by adding benefit levels to the model, the future state pension benefits of all individuals can be simulated. The total costs for the state pension can be calculated by aggregating the individual benefits. All calculations within the model are done at the current price level.
A.3 The participation status model
From the database of pension entitlements, also the labour market status of all individuals aged 15 to 64 is known. Participants can be either employees or self-employed. We abstract from the self-employed, for who we have no data on private pension savings, by assuming their pension savings on average to be equal to those of the employees. Non-participants can be either studying, receiving a benefit, early retired or non-participating at all. Figure 8 shows the distribution of the 2005 Dutch population by age and by participation category. One of the most striking conclusions from the above graph is that in the last couple of years before the statutory retirement age of 65, only a small minority of the population is still working. This is mainly due to the popularity of early retirement schemes and the use of benefits, especially disability and unemployment, as an early exit route (see e.g. Kapteyn and de Vos, 2004) . For example, of the 64 years old, only 11% is working, whereas 27% is on benefit and 39% is early retired. However, the participation rate among the 60-64 years old is currently rising due to policy changes in especially early retirement schemes and disability insurance (Euwals, de Mooij and van Vuuren, 2009 ).
In SADNAP, age and gender dependent transition probabilities are used to determine whether participants remain participating or become non-participants and vice versa. The transition probabilities can be derived from the age-and gender specific forecast of participation rates from CPB as described in section 3.3. Participation in SADNAP is a binary state. Participants include employees, self-employed and the involuntarily unemployed who are actively searching for a job. Non-participants are not available to the labour market and include students, disability benefits, early retired and the voluntarily unemployed.
When PN denotes the probability of being non-participating and PP the probability of participating, the transition probabilities PNP (probability of a non-participant participating the next year) and PPN (probability of a participant non-participating the next year) can be defined as follows: Again, if the correction terms (age, gender) are set to zero, most individuals will have only one lasting period of participation during their lifetime. The higher the correction terms are set, the Draft more short periods of participation and non-participation will occur during a life-course. In the baseline scenario, the terms are set to zero. The transition probabilities are used only until people turn 60. From that age on, the retirement decision (for the ones that are still participating at age 60) is modelled through the behavioural option value model as described in section 4. Almost 15% of the population aged 15-64 already has a reduced right. This is about the same as the share of reduced rights among the current population of pensioners, but this percentage will rise in the future because before reaching the age of 65 part of the population aged 15-64 who at the moment are having a complete entitlement can lose some years of building up rights when they go abroad.
B.1 State pension data
B.2 Company pension data
Recently, Statistics Netherlands has also started providing micro data on (2 nd pillar) company pensions. In 2009, a micro dataset has become available based on data of a representative sample of pension funds including the large pension funds for civil servants and health workers.
This file includes individual data on company pension entitlements of 53% of the population aged 15-64 and 67% of the Dutch employees. Some characteristics of the data source on private pension entitlements can be found in table 7. Draft When interpreting the data, we see familiar patterns like wages and pension entitlements rising with age and men, natives and cohabitants having considerably higher wages and pensions than women, immigrants and singles respectively. On average, employees have expected 2 nd pillar pension savings of € 11,394 which is more than the expected state pension savings 9 . The data confirm the growing importance of company pensions as an income component of the elderly.
The expected private pension peaks in the age category 50-54. Decreases past that age are most probably due to people with high pension savings tending to retire earlier, although it is also known that the younger cohorts tend to have higher 2 nd pillar pension savings (SZW, 2006) .
Also, a correlation between 1 st and 2 nd pillar pensions exists. People with high company pensions more often have a complete state pension, whereas people with incomplete state pension entitlements more often have smaller or no company pensions. Rather surprising though, is that people with reduced state pension entitlements tend to have higher wages than people with complete entitlements. However, this holds only true for the population of employees, which indicates that people that have lived abroad for a while tend to have higher than average wages. 9 In 2005, the maximum state pension for a single was € 11,211 and for a partner of a couple € 8,008. Draft
For the general population, immigrants with reduced state pension entitlements tend to be more often on benefits.
The median replacement rate 10 is 0.73, but there are sizeable differences between subgroups with women, natives and singles having higher replacement rates than men, immigrants and cohabitants respectively. The high replacement rates of women are due to the large share of women in the Netherlands who during their life-course change to part-time jobs whereas pension savings up till then may have been based on full-time jobs. The higher replacement rates of singles are due to the higher 1 st pillar state pension they qualify for. The replacement rates tend to decrease by age. This is partly due to younger cohorts having higher 2 nd pillar pension savings, although it should be kept in mind that in a career average system, replacement rates will go down with age as wages tend to grow with age and replacement rates are related to the final wage. Also the very high replacement rates among the youngest age groups need explanation. In the Netherlands a full minimum wage can only be earned at 23 years of age. Wages below that age tend to be lower, whereas expected private pensions take account of the wage increase due to legal requirements. But because major career jumps still have to take place at that age, the expected private pensions for the younger cohorts are not reliable indicators anyway.
Statistics Netherlands is currently preparing a micro dataset on (3 rd pillar) individual arrangements, based mainly on data files from insurance companies. This dataset is expected to be available to researchers in 2009. These data are especially important for groups that cannot participate in the company pension schemes, like the self-employed. Finally, Statistics
Netherlands is preparing a micro dataset on personal wealth, the so-called 4 th pillar from tax office databases. This 4 th pillar is known to play a role in the retirement decision (Bloemen, 2006) and can also be particularly important when intergenerational wealth transfers are researched.
B.3 Macro data sources
In SADNAP, also some macro data sources are used. On demographic events, the most recent population projection by age, gender and ethnicity by Statistics Netherlands (CBS, 2009) is used.
From this projection, that runs from 2008 to 2050, we take the number of births and the number of immigrants by age and gender per year. Also mortality rates and emigration rates by age and Draft gender are deducted from this projection. Although this official projection is used in the baseline scenario, by including the underlying processes of emigration, immigration, births and deaths, the model allows for analyses of alternative scenarios in which (policy-driven) changes in for example immigration or emigration levels can be represented. In SADNAP, a narrow definition of ethnicity is used, distinguishing only between natives and immigrants (people not born in the Netherlands)
as distinguishing between 2 nd generation non-natives and natives is not important for the state pension entitlements.
Information on household types is available for the most recent population projection.
From this projection, that runs from 2009 to 2050, the cohabiting rates by age and gender are derived. The CBS data distinguish between singles, partners of a couple, lone parents, children living with their parents, people living in an institution and a rest group of people cohabiting without having a relationship to each other (e.g. students). In SADNAP we only distinguish between singles and cohabitants based on the social benefits they would qualify for. The rest group of people living together without having a relationship is considered to be single. From the people living in an institution, half is considered to be single and half to be cohabiting.
On labour participation, the most recent labour participation rates as provided by The
Netherlands Bureau of Economic Policy Analysis (CPB, 2009) are used. These are average participation rates for five year age classes by gender. From these five year averages, participation rates for individual ages can be deducted. These participation rates include all persons that are available to the labour market, including the involuntarily unemployed who are actively searching for jobs. The non-participants are mainly students, disability beneficiaries, early retired and the voluntarily unemployed (e.g. housewives). SADNAP currently lacks a model of benefit use during the life-course. However, benefit use plays an important role in determining the net effects of ageing-related policy measures, like raising the retirement age. Therefore, in SADNAP the final state of benefit use at the age of 64 is modelled. It is assumed that benefit use at that high ages is an absorbing state (outflow rates are near zero). In 2005, based on the CBS dataset, 27% of the 64 years old was on benefit: 17% in the disability insurance scheme, 2% in the unemployment insurance scheme, 4% on social assistance and 4% on other benefits. Because of the major reform of the DI scheme, the use of disability benefits will decline in the future. Longterm disability rates are based on current long-term forecasts based on the model described in Van Sonsbeek and Gradus (2006) . In the meantime, also the unemployment scheme has underwent major reforms, limiting the duration of the benefit from a maximum of 7.5 years in In table 9 , an overview is presented of the macro data sources used. 
